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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Only in the past few years has any case law appeared which specifically
addressed the problem. In People v. West49 the California Supreme
Court held that court room disclosure and recordation of plea bargain-
ing agreements would be required in California. To avoid the needless
waste of courtroom time and expense which would occur every time a
defendant alleged a breach of a plea bargaining agreement, courts will
necessarily have to begin disclosing and recording these agreements.
Otherwise, false allegations of plea bargains will surely occur. Disclo-
sure and recordation of plea bargains would also provide further pro-
tection for defendants by eliminating the almost impossible task of
proving a plea bargain.
RICHARD L. VANORE
Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment Protection and Handwriting
Exemplars-Is Probable Cause Unreasonable?
After the Supreme Court decision in Gilbert v. California,' which
specifically rejected any constitutional objection to the compulsion of
handwriting exemplars grounded on either the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination or the sixth amendment right to counsel,
defendants have redoubled their efforts to bring handwriting exemplars
within the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure.2 They have argued that courts should deny any governmen-
tal request for handwriting exemplars that, if granted, would violate the
defendant's fourth amendment rights and that the exclusionary rule
should be available to enforce that requirement.'
493 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); see United States v. Williams, 407
F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969); State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, - W. Va. -, 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971).
1388 U.S. 263 (1967).
'The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. This protection is guaranteed by the judicially imposed exclusionary rule. In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court barred, in a federal prosecution, the use
of evidence secured through an illegal search or seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
extended this protection to criminal trials in state courts.
'See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972), where the court applied
the exclusionary rule to suppress handwriting exemplars taken from one defendant, finding that
the defendant was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.
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Davis v. Mississippi,4 decided by the Supreme Court in 1969, has
been the leading case in the area of fourth amendment protection for
such nontestimonial evidence as fingerprints and voice or handwriting
exemplars. In Davis the Supreme Court invoked the exclusionary rule
to reverse the defendant's conviction on the ground that the fingerprint
evidence used at his trial was the product of an unlawful detention and
therefore should have been excluded. 5 Stressing the need for judicial
scrutiny, the Court held that the fourth amendment protection applies
to the "investigatory stage" and to "detentions for the sole purpose of
obtaining fingerprints." 6 However, Davis did not conclusively desig-
nate probable cause as the required fourth amendment standard.7
Apparently Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, realized the burden
that the decision in Davis could place on police investigatory practices,
for he suggested that "because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting
process, such detentions [for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints]
might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with
the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the
traditional sense."" This dictum has given rise to varying responses.
Recently, courts have considered fourth amendment claims with
respect to handwriting exemplars not only in the factual context of a
request for exemplars by the prosecution but also in the context of a
request by a grand jury. Two main questions are presented by these
fourth amendment claims: does the taking of handwriting exemplars
constitute a search or seizure protected by the fourth amendment and,
if so, what showing must the government make in order to satisfy the
reasonbleness standards of the fourth amendment? The decisions reflect
different answers to both questions.' Three of these decisions present the
4394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Vd. at 722-23. In an investigation concerning the rape of an elderly white woman, the defen-
dant was fingerprinted along with at least twenty-four other Negro youths. After being investigated
at several other times, the defendant was driven ninety miles, jailed overnight, returned and again
fingerprinted.
'Id. at 727.
'Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), stated the traditional probable cause test: "[w]hether
at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the police officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."
1394 U.S. at 727.
'Compare In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub
noant. United States v. In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 92 S. Ct. 2058 (1972) (No. 71-850); In
re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253 (D.N.J. 1972); and United States v. Bailey, 327 F. Supp. 802 (N.D.
III. 1971), with United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S. Ct. 1243 (1972)
(No. A-926).
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extent of divergence in viewpoints. In United States v. Praigg,1' involv-
ing a police request for exemplars from a defendant who was free on
bail after an arrest for forgery, the court held that handwriting exem-
plars fall within the protection of the fourth amendment and can be
compelled only on a showing of probable cause. In In re September
1971 Grand Jury," presently before the Supreme Court, the Seventh
Circuit held that a grand jury request for handwriting exemplars con-
stitutes a search and seizure within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment and must be substantiated by a governmental showing of reason-
ableness not necessarily amounting to probable cause. On the other
hand, in United States v. Doe,12 the Second Circuit did not reach the
question of what showing the government must make since the court
held that the use of process to compel handwriting exemplars for a
grand jury does not constitute a search and seizure within the fourth
amendment. Since the Supreme Court has not specifically recognized
a constitutionally protected interest in nontestimonial evidence such as
fingerprints and voice or handwriting exemplars, this note will consider
the rationales in Praigg, Doe, and 1971 Grand Jury in an attempt to
determine the basis of such a fourth amendment interest. More speci-
fically, this note will consider whether the approach taken by the 1971
Grand Jury court in the grand jury context should be applied to the
police-citizen encounter in Praigg.
In addition to Davis, the defendants in Praigg, Doe, and 1971
Grand Jury also relied upon In re Dionisio,3 a per curiam decision by
the Seventh Circuit which is presently before the Supreme Court, being
argued in tandem with 1971 Grand Jury. Dionisio reversed a lower
court order committing the defendants for contempt for their refusal
to furnish voice exemplars as requested by a grand jury. The court in
Dionisio cited Davis for the proposition that, under the fourth amend-
ment, "law enforcement officials may not compel the production of
physical evidence absent a showing of the reasonableness of the sei-
zure."' 4 Reasoning from Hale v. Henkel,'5 in which the Supreme Court
struck down grand jury subpoenas as overbroad because of the inherent
1*336 F. Supp. 480 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
11454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. In re September 1971
Grand Jury, 92 S. Ct. 2058 (1972) (No. 71-850).
12457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S. Ct. 1243 (1972) (No. A-926).
13442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Dionisio,
92 S. Ct. 2056 (1972) (No. 71-229).
"Id. at 280.
5201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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unreasonableness of general fishing expeditions, the court in Dionisio
concluded that voice exemplars were as much within the scope of the
reasonableness requirement as were the books and papers subpoenaed
in Hale v. Henkel." With respect to requests by a grand jury, the court
in Dionisio went on to state that "[t]he fourth amendment bans 'whole-
sale intrusions' upon personal security whether such intrusions stem
from illegal arrests or from grand jury subpoenas ostensibly issued only
because of the Government's bald statement that the witnesses are
potential defendants."'' 7
But in United States v. Doe,'" the Second Circuit affirmed an order
adjudging the defendant in contempt for her refusal to furnish handwrit-
ing exemplars to a grand jury. The court held that where a grand jury
had not engaged in either a search or a seizure, there is no justification
for a court's imposing even so moderate a requirement as a showing of
reasonableness." In an attempt to determine exactly what fourth
amendment interest, if any, the defendant had in her handwriting exem-
plars, the court distinguished Davis by differentiating between a
detention to take the handwriting exemplars and the taking of the exem-
plars themselves. The court characterized the Davis fact pattern as a
"police-citizen encounter which amounted to a 'seizure' of the person. '"20
Since no preliminary showing of need or relevancy is required to sub-
poena a person before a grand jury, the court concluded that compul-
sory appearance before a grand jury cannot constitute a seizure of the
person.2' This distinction left the court free to determine whether the
defendant had a valid fourth amendment claim to her handwriting ex-
emplars themselves. The court held that she did not, since a grand jury
request for exemplars did not violate the defendant's "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. ' 22 To underscore the position that the defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated by compulsion
of her handwriting exemplars, the opinion incorporated a quotation
from Davis, stating that "fingerprinting, surely more nearly private than
exemplars of the voice or handwriting, 'involves none of the probing into
an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
"1442 F.2d at 279.
11d. at 281.
1"457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S. Ct. 1243 (1972) (No. A-926).
"Id. at 900.
"Id. at 898.
2"/d.
11d. at 898-99.
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search.' ",23 Thus, because of the difference in the extent of the intru-
sions involved in the two cases, the Doe court read Davis as authority
for a grand jury dispensing with a showing of probable cause to obtain
handwriting exemplars.
Other courts have declined to distinguish a detention for taking
exemplars from any interest the defendant might have in the exemplar
itself. The courts generally have held that the interposition of the grand
jury between the witnesses and the government does not eliminate the
fourth amendment protection which would otherwise bar the govern-
ment from obtaining the evidence.24 For example, the court in United
States v. Bailey,5 rather than recognizing different standards for the
police and the grand jury, concluded that the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Dionisio announced a new constitutional principle that equated the
grand jury with the police so far as the fourth amendment is concerned.
It would seem that the court in Doe did not require the grand jury
to make the same showing of reasonableness as it would require of the
police because of a misconception of the actual function of the grand
jury. Recognizing the grand jury's investigative power to compel hand-
writing exemplars without even a showing of reasonableness, the Second
Circuit referred to the grand jury's function as a "protective buffer
between the accused and the prosecutor" included in the fifth amend-
ment to safeguard the defendant against unfounded prosecution. 6 How-
ever, other courts, recognizing that the grand jury frequently functions
under the direction of the prosecutor as an arm of the prosecution, have
refused to exempt the grand jury from making a showing of reasonable-
ness.2 Therefore, a decision such as Doe that would require a showing
of reasonableness by the police but not by the grand jury could eventu-
ally undermine Davis and completely subvert any "protective buffer"
function of the grand jury. If the grand jury were not required to show
the reasonableness of its requests for exemplars, the police could accom-
3Id. at 899.
211n re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. granted sub non. United
States v;. Dionisio, 92 S. Ct. 2056 (1972) (No: 71-229); United States v. Bailey, 332 F. Supp. 1351
(N.D. I11. 1971); In re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253 (D.N.J. 1972).
21332 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. III. 1971).
2457 F.2d at 899. The court found sufficient procedural protections, without reliance on the
fourth amendment, in the grand jury requirements of enforced secrecy and the use of court process
rather than the "constable's intruding hand" as a means of gathering evidence.
"See, e.g., note 24 supra. Also, 1971 Grand Jury, recognizing that the grand jury has fre-
quently been used as a tool of the prosecution, held that governmental use of the grand jury to
perform investigative work formerly done by regular investigative agencies constitutes an abuse of
the grand jury process. 454 F.2d at 585.
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plish their investigations by empaneling a grand jury and having it direct
law enforcement officers to round up all possible suspects and compel
each of them to provide the appropriate exemplars.
Since evidence seized in an unconstitutional search is ordinarily just
as reliable as evidence seized under a valid warrant, the defendant's
objection is not to the trustworthiness of the evidence or to the adequacy
of the trial procedure. Rather the objection under the fourth amendment
is to the manner in which the evidence was acquired. 2 The taking of
handwriting exemplars is certainly a type of search; the police take
evidence from the person of the defendant to be used in determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether the defendant is
guilty. Since the fourth amendment would protect a defendant's home
from a warrantless search for exemplars, an intrusion into his personal
privacy to compel similar exemplars should also be protected. Where
the police or the grand jury seek to obtain handwriting exemplars, the
defendant should be able to invoke the protection of the fourth amend-
ment to insure that the search and seizure is not accomplished in an
unreasonable manner.
The extent of the fourth amendment protection is necessarily con-
tingent upon the degree of reasonableness required by the court's inter-
pretation of the required standard. The court in Praigg applied the
standard of probable cause, as required by the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment;29 the court in 1971 Grand Jury applied a less strin-
gent standard of reasonableness. 3 An examination of the rationale be-
hind each decision and the logical implications of each decision would
seem to suggest that if the courts do recognize a fourth amendment
interest in handwriting exemplars, the same standard of reasonableness
applied in the grand jury context might also be applicable to the police-
citizen encounter.
Having determined that the taking of the defendant's handwriting
exemplars is within the fourth amendment, the court in Praigg stated
the premise that "'a search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant author-
izes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.' "31 Then
finding that handwriting exemplars do not fall within the "limited ex-
ceptions to the rule that searches and seizures must be based upon
"2J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 14 (1966).
29336 F. Supp. at 484.
3"454 F.2d at 584-85.
11336 F. Supp. at 483-84, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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probable cause, ' 32 the court imposed the warrant clause requirements
of probable cause and specificity:
[A]t the least. . . the government must demonstrate in its motion that
probable cause exists to believe the defendant was involved in a sub-
stantive violation of the law in which his handwriting played a part. It
would not be sufficient, on the other hand, to show merely that a
handwriting exemplar would be helpful to the preparation of the gov-
ernment's case or that it might be relevant to the investigation of other
crimes in which the defendant's involvement is suspected.33
The Praigg court's analysis leads to an automotic application of the
same probable cause and specificity requirements that have traditionally
been required when the police seek warrants for the search and seizure
of property. Although probable cause is usually an essential requirement
for a lawful search and seizure,34 there is some authority for a limited
intrusion based on less than probable cause. 5 Also, since the intrusion
in Praigg was to obtain nontestimonial evidence similar in nature to
fingerprints, Justice Brennan's dictum in Davis concerning the taking
of fingerprints without probable cause becomes all the more relevant.
The analytical approach used by the Supreme Court in Schmerber
v. California36 is also relevant to the taking of handwriting exemplars.
Schmerber, decided before Davis, involved a defendant's constitutional
objections to police compulsion of samples of his blood. After determin-
ing that the defendant had no valid fifth or sixth amendment objection
to the compulsion of the blood sample, the court considered his fourth
amendment claim. Noting that "[s]uch testing procedures [taking blood
samples] plainly constitute searches of 'persons' and depend antece-
dently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning of that Amend-
ment," the court stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against
all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in
the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other
words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police
were justified in requiring petitioner to submit [to the taking of the
3
"Id. at 484.
3Id.
"Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
"See text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
3-384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"Id. at 767.
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blood sample] and whether the means and procedures employed [in
taking the blood sample] respected relevant Fourth Amendment stan-
dards of reasonableness."
Because alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream with the passage of
time and because the sample was taken incident to arrest, the Court in
Schmerber found an exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore,
in analyzing any fourth amendment claim, especially any claim not
subject to the warrant requirement, it is necessary to examine the facts
of each case in order to determine just what would respect "relevant
Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness."
Since the court in In re September 1971 Grand Jury was concerned
with a request for handwriting exemplars by a grand jury, the court used
"reasonableness" rather than warrant clause probable cause as the stan-
dard. In 1971 Grand Jury, the Seventh Circuit fleshed out its decision
in Dionisio and defined the "content" of the "reasonableness" that the
government is required to show to compel handwriting exemplars for a
grand jury. After concluding that the government "must affirmatively
show that the grand jury process is not being abused," the court contin-
ued: "[I]t would be an abuse of the grand jury process for the Govern-
ment to conduct a general fishing expedition under grand jury sponsor-
ship with the mere explanation that the witnesses are potential defen-
dants." 9 While there must be "a sufficiently explicit connection be-
tween the identification evidence sought and the purpose to be served,"
the connection, the Seventh Circuit is careful to point out, need not
amount to probable cause."
The Praigg solution requiring probable cause has the advantage of
easy judicial determination and certainly protects the defendant from
police harassment or overbroad searches. However, the government is
in the position of needing probable cause to indict but at the same time
also needing to show probable cause to obtain sufficient evidence to
indict." Thus, in cases like Praigg where the police have a forged docu-
ment and seek the handwriting exemplars of a suspect in order to obtain
probable cause to arrest or indict, they must first show probable cause
to believe that the suspect was involved in a substantive crime in which
111d. at 768.
"Id. at 585.
401d.
"This is, of course, the same situation encountered by the police in obtaining fingerprints when
they work in a jurisdiction which requires a strict showing of probable cause under Davis. See
Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 244, 255-56 (1970).
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his handwriting played a part. Obvously it would be extremely difficult
to make this showing of probable cause at the investigatory stage; there-
fore, without the exemplars, often there would be no way to connect the
forgeries with the suspects.
In an attempt to protect the interests of both society in law enforce-
ment and of the individual in the security of his person, one obvious
solution, consistent with the suggestion in Davis, would be to allow a
judicially supervised detention for the purpose of taking handwriting
exemplars on a governmental showing of reasonableness not necessarily
amounting to probable cause to arrest.
One result of the suggestion in Davis has been the proposal to add
a Rule 41.142 to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to define the
procedure for the police to follow in obtaining nontestimonial evi-
dence. 3 The proposed rule would allow a magistrate to issue an order
for nontestimonial personal identification evidence (including handwrit-
ing exemplars) only on the basis of a sworn affidavit establishing:
1) that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed;
2) that there are reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable
cause to arrest, to suspect that the person named or described in the
affidavit committed the offense; and
3) that the results of specific nontestimonial identification pro-
cedures will be of material aid in determining whether the person
named in the affidavit committed the offense.4
Rule 41.1 would incorporate several provisions to protect the rights
of the individual: the time and place for the taking of the evidence can
be suited to the individual's convenience;45 the order, on its face, would
give the individual full information as to the purpose and extent of the
evidence to be taken;" and detention would be no "longer than is rea-
sonably necessary to conduct the specified nontestimonial proce-
dures. 47 The rule further requires that the products of the identification
4252 F.R.D. 462 (1971).
"Proposed Rule 41.1 is noted in Note, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41,1,
56 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1972), which concluded that the Supreme Court would probably adopt the
proposed rule if submitted for their consideration. But see Note, Detention to Obtain Physical
Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1972), concluding that the proposed rule should not be adopted
since it erodes constitutional protections.
"Proposed Rule 41.1(c), 52 F.R.D. at 463.
"Proposed Rule 41.1(e), 52 F.R.D. at 464.
"Proposed Rule 41.1(h), 52 F.R.D. at 464-65.
"Proposed Rule 41.1(i), 52 F.R.D. at 465.
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procedure be returned to the issuing magistrate within forty-five days.
If at the end of this forty-five day period the evidence does not amount
to probable cause to believe that the individual has committed an of-
fense, the individual is entitled to an order compelling the destruction
of the products of the investigation. However, the rule further provides
that the destruction order will not be granted if the government makes
a showing of "good cause." '
The reasoning that led Justice Brennan to conclude that
"[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intru-
sion upon personal security than other types of police searches and
detentions" is also applicable to the taking of handwriting exemplars.
Since a suspect cannot destroy his handwriting ability, the "limited
detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time."5
Also, there would be no reason for the police to fail to obtain prior
judicial authorization. Like fingerprinting, the process of taking hand-
writing exemplars does not involve probing into an individual's thoughts
as an interrogation does.51
Proposed Rule 41.1 is founded upon more authority than just the
dictum in Davis. In several different situations the Supreme Court has
categorized an intrusion as within the fourth amendment but has never-
theless allowed the intrusion on a showing that did not amount to proba-
ble cause. In Camara v. Municipal Court'52 the Supreme Court held that
administrative inspections for the purpose of enforcing housing codes
must meet warrant clause requirements. However, the applicable stan-
dard was reasonableness, not probable cause, thereby giving "full recog-
nition to the competing public and private interests . . . at stake.' 53
In Terry v. Ohio,54 the Court used this balancing approach in the context
of a criminal prosecution to allow a police officer to make a self-
protective search for weapons without probable cauge. The limited
search was reasonable since society's interest in the protection of its
police officers outweighed the individual's right to be secure in his per-
son from the limited search involved. In Wyman v. James,55 the Court
"Proposed Rule 41.1(0), 52 F.R.D. at 465-66.
"Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
501d.
"See id.
52387 U.S. 523 (1967).
-"Id. at 539.
5"392 U.S. I (1968).
"400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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rejected the claim of a state welfare beneficiary who contended that a
home visit, when not consented to or supported by probable cause,
violated her fourth amendment rights. Here the Court balanced so-
ciety's interest in the proper administration of the welfare program
against the proposed limited intrusion into the security of the defen-
dant's home. Although the Court held that the authorized home visit
was not a search, the opinion went further to state that even if it were,
it would not be unreasonable under the fourth amendment.56
The taking of handwriting exemplars presents a situation in which
individual rights must be carefully balanced against societal rights. If
the police were to have uncontrolled discretionary power to compel
exemplars, any investigation could turn into a dragnet in which anyone
could be forced to compromise the security and privacy of his person.
On the other hand, if the police were to be initially required to show
traditional probable cause as a prerequisite to obtaining exemplars,
police effectiveness would be lost to an unproductive merry-go-round
standard requiring probable cause in order to obtain sufficient evidence
to show probable cause to arrest. Since the taking of handwriting exem-
plars does involve obtaining evidence from the person of a suspect and
since this taking is so intimately tied to a detention restricting the free-
dom of the person, the taking should first be judicially scrutinized.
In an attempt to resolve the question of whether a court should
distinguish between nontestimonial identification evidence and the more
usual forms of criminal evidence that are objects of police searches,
application of the 1971 Grand Jury standard of reasonableness probably
does not provide a standard that will safeguard both the public and the
private interests. The adoption of a strictly limited statutory procedure
similar to proposed Rule 41.1 could possibly protect both public and
private interests. The requirement of a judicial determination of the
reasonableness of the requests of both the grand jury and the police
would insure due process in that an individual would not be subject to
arbitrary contempt citations for noncompliance. This same requirement
of a showing of reasonableness should also be sufficient to prevent any
investigatory dragnet fishing expeditions. Of course if a magistrate
erred, defendants could appeal that decision in the same manner as they
would the issuance of a warrant on less than probable cause. Neverthe-
less, to effectively safeguard the interests involved, courts should apply
a rule such as proposed Rule 41.1 very carefully, realizing that any
-11d. at 318.
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TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENTS
investigation on a showing of less than probable cause approaches the
outer limit of a permissible governmental intrusion.
KENNETH R. KELLER
Criminal Procedure-Free Transcripts for Indigents
In Britt v. North Carolina' the United States Supreme Court, for
only the second time2 since the Griffin v. Illinois3 decision in 1956,
refused to grant an indigent state defendant a free transcript of a prior
proceeding. Following the landmark Griffin case, which held that an
indigent petitioner was entitled to a trdnscript of his trial for use on
direct appeal, the Court had consistently expanded the right of indigents
to free records to include use of a transcript in habeas corpus proceed-
ings,4 appeal of habeas corpus proceedings, 5 and de novo habeas corpus
hearings.' The procedural relationship in Britt was entirely different
from any of the prior transcript cases the Court had heard, for it was a
request for a record of a mistrial for use during the second trial. The
distinctions in the procedures involved could have served as a basis for
the denial of the transcript, but the Court did not rest its decision on
the basis of the difference in procedural posture. Instead the Britt fact
pattern seems to have been forced into the Griffin line of cases in order
to make clear a new policy of more limited application of Griffin in the
future.
Britt had been indicted for first degree murder, and his first trial
had ended in a hung jury. Before the start of the second trial the defen-
dant's attorney had requested a free transcript of the mistrial, but no
particular reason for the request was given other than the defendant's
indigency. The trial court denied the motion, and in a second trial in
the same town Britt was convicted. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the refusal to grant
192 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
'The only other decision which upheld the denial of a transcript was Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963), where the court reporter for the defendant's trial had died and no one could read
his shorthand notes.
3351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
'Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
'Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
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